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Abstract
Improvement in efficiency of healthcare in the United States is an urgent issue. Information
technology is seen as one of key solutions to improve efficiency. As such, hospitals in the United
States are rapidly adopting information technology. However, past studies on information technology
development projects in other industries have documented a very high rate of failure, typically
attributable to the lack of treatment of organizational and behavioral factors. These studies placed
their focus on the development phase of information technology projects but very few studied the
performance of installed information systems and factors affecting their performance.
In our study, we developed an analytical framework to measure the performance of an existing
information system and to identify determinants of its performance based on the Performance of
Routine Information System Management Framework by MEASURE Evaluation Project, United
States Agency for International Development. Performance is defined as the quality of data and the
use of information an information system generates. Technical, behavioral, and organizational factors
are considered as determinants of Performance.
We evaluated the performance of an information system which records operating room delays and
their causes at a large teaching hospital in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The study was carried out
between January 2007 and April 2007. The data on operating room delays from fiscal year 2006 were
used to assess the data quality.
Our study found poor quality of data and a low level of use of information. Data quality was poor in
terms of accuracy and relevance and very few people used the information that the system generated
for decision-making. The performance of the information system was influenced by 1) technical
factors such as the confusing structure of data variables and the application design, 2) organizational
factors such as the lack of a defined purpose for the information system in operating room delay
management and the lack of supervision and training, and 3) behavioral factors such as diminished
motivation for gathering accurate information for the information system. Finally, we proposed a set
of recommendations to improve the performance of the information system.
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Introduction
Improving the efficiency of healthcare in the United States is an urgent issue. According to
"Health, United States 2006," the United States spent $1.9 trillion, or 16% of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), on healthcare in 2004[1]. This level of national expenditure breaks
down into an average expenditure of $6,280 per person. The United States spends more on
health care than any other developed country in the world. In fact, the United States spent
$2,000 more than Norway, the country with the second most expensive healthcare, spent in
2003[1]. The growth of healthcare expenditure is also alarming. Between 1995 and 2004, the
growth rate of United States healthcare expenditure consistently surpassed the growth rate of
the GDP.
This extremely high level of expenditure has not necessarily resulted in an increase in safety
in U.S. healthcare. According to the Institute of Medicine, errors are commonplace in drug
treatment at U.S. hospitals[2]. The Institute reports that 380,000 to 450,000 preventable
adverse drug events occur at hospital settings each year. Worse yet, medical errors are the
eighth leading cause of death in the country and result in an estimated 98,000 deaths
annually[3].
The adoption of information technology in other industries in the United States is often
attributed to increased labor productivity in 1990s. Researchers such as Oliner and Sichel
demonstrated a positive relationship between information technology and the increase in labor
productivity[4]. Therefore, it is no surprise that many leaders in the healthcare industry
consider the use of information technology a key solution to addressing inefficiency, high cost,
and safety problems in healthcare. The Institute of Medicine lists the use of information
technology as the second most important step to reduce drug errors, after an improvement in
the patient-provider relationship[2]. The RAND Corporation estimates that information
technology could save I billion annually by preventing medical errors and $77 billion by
improving the efficiency of healthcare[5].
The healthcare industry has lagged behind other industries in the adoption of information
technology, though this situation is rapidly changing. Although the rate of adoption varies
widely depending on the type of application, according to the report on the diffusion of
information technology in the healthcare industry by the RAND Corporation, about 30
percent of acute-care hospital providers ordered Electric Health Record products by the end of
2003 and this is expected to increase to 80 percent by 2016[6]. The cost of the adoption of
information technology is estimated at $8 billion per year for the next 15 years in order to
cover 90% of healthcare providers by 2021 [5]. In this RAND Corporation report, adoption is
measured by the proportion of healthcare providers that ordered information technology
interventions. Therefore, it does not necessarily reflect the proportion of providers that are
successfully using information technology. In the literature on information technology, the
failure of an information technology project is often defined as the cancellation of a project,
the project running longer than originally scheduled, or the project running over budget[7-9].
According to the Standish Group Report on software project failures in 1995, more than 30
percent of software development projects were cancelled. The same report found only 16.2
percent of information technology projects were considered successful, i.e. completed on-time
and without running over budget. Clegg et al. found similar results in 1997[8]. Their study
reported that "up to 90% of all IT [information technology] projects fail to meet their goals;
80% are late and over-budget and 40% are abandoned." The 2006 report by the Standish
Group reported only a slight improvement in the situation; cancellation has dropped to 19
percent and the success rate has increased to 35 percent.
The high failure rate of technology development projects is not the only difficulty faced in
harnessing the benefit of information technology. A developed technology system needs to
be effectively in order to produce a return on the investment. Past studies on the successes
and failures of information technology projects have shown that human and organizational
factors, such as the organizational structure, the extent of user involvement, and executive
management support, have a strong influence in determining the outcome of the project[ 10-
12]. The importance of human and organizational factors is applicable for the success of
information technology projects in the healthcare industry.
Many hospitals in the United States are forced to make decisions on whether or not to invest
in information technology based on the constraints of a very small profit margin[ 13].
Hospitals need to make sure that the systems they invest in will meet their performance
expectations. Controlling the factors that influence the outcomes of information technology
projects is critical for hospitals.
Past studies on information technology adoption focused on the development phase of
information systems or software and determined its success or failure by examining
expenditure and time spent on the project[7-9]. These studies are useful in identifying factors
which influence the outcome of the development phase of information systems; however, they
fail to provide insight into what happens once the development project is completed, such as
how to ensure that the system meets performance expectations. In other words, a literature
review revealed that the measurement of performance of information systems and the
identification of the factors influencing the performance are relatively unexplored areas of
research.
In this study, we attempted to measure the performance of an existing information system at
the operating room administration of a large teaching hospital in Boston, Massachusetts, and
to identify factors that affect the performance. We first developed an analytical framework
based on the Performance of Routine Information System Management framework developed
by the MEASURE Evaluation project. Using the framework as a guide, we evaluated the
performance of the information system against its functional objectives, i.e., the production of
high quality data and the use of data for decision making. The staff and healthcare workers
who were identified as the stakeholders of the information system were interviewed in order
to understand the organizational and behavioral factors that influence the performance. The
goal of the study was to evaluate the performance of an information system and to come up
with a list of recommendations for improving the performance of the information system.
Analytical Framework to Evaluate the Performance of an Information System
Historically, technical literature on information system management investigated the "failure"
of information system development[ 10]. For example, studies by Clegg et al. and by the
Standish Group defined the failure of information system development as a project that ran
over-time, over-budget, or was cancelled before completion[8, 9]. These definitions are
helpful in evaluating the outcome of information technology development; however they fall
short of being useful for evaluating existing information systems' performances and
developing strategies to improve them. For instance, an information system might have been
"successfully" installed in terms of budget and time. But successful installation does not
guarantee the use of the system by its intended users. Lack of use indicates a failure in
creating an intended impact. As this example illustrates, assessing success or failure of
information system development does not necessarily yield the information necessary for
determining the effective use of the information system after installation.
The first step of a performance evaluation of an information system is to define the
"performance" of the information system that we intend to evaluate. The Blackwell
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Management Information Systems defines performance
evaluation of computer systems[ 14] as:
"The performance of a computer system is specified or determined by system characteristics
such as:
- responsiveness: time to perform a given task or set of tasks
- throughput: rate at which the service is performed
- utilization: resources consumed while performing the service
- reliability: probability of error while performing the service
- availability: fraction of time the system is available to perform service"
A computer system is defined as an organization of hardware and software in this definition.
While these characteristics are useful in determining hardware and software functionality of
an information system, they do not tell if the performance of a system meets expectation or
not. We determined that this framework was not suitable for our study.
Performance of Routine Information System Management Framework
In this study, a conceptual framework developed by the MEASURE Evaluation Project for
assessment of routine health information systems was adopted to develop an analytical
framework for the performance evaluation of a hospital information system. The conceptual
framework proposed by the MEASURE Evaluation Project was initially named "Prism
Framework" and was first presented at a Workshop on Enhancing the Quality and Use of
Health Information at the District Level in 2003[15]. This framework was proposed as "an
analytical framework that helps to improve our understanding of the performance of routine
health information systems in developing countries" and to "define strategies to address
constraints on performance." Lafond et al. defined routine health information as "information
that is derived at regular intervals of a year or less through mechanisms designed to meet
predictable information needs[ 15]" in a paper introducing the Prism Framework. We
determined that this definition fits the description of the hospital information system that is
evaluated in this study. The Prism framework also defines the performance of health
information systems as the production of high quality data and the use of the information that
the system generates. It argues that "the ultimate objective of a routine health information
system is to produce information for taking action" and, therefore, the performance of a
system "should be measured not only on the basis of the quality of data but on evidence of the
continued use of these data for improving health system operations."
Figure 1 illustrates the Prism Framework[ 16]. It describes that the outputs of health
information system interventions are influenced by three determinants, i.e.
Environmental/Organizational Determinants, Technical Determinants, and Behavioral
Determinants. In Figure 1, these three determinants are depicted as the three apexes of a
triangle. This composition corresponds well to the importance of organizational and
behavioral factors in successful information system projects suggested by the studies of Clegg
et al. and the Standish Group [8-10]. The Prism Framework implies that the outputs of a
health information system should contribute to the improvement of health system
performance, which ultimately contributes to the improvement of health outcomes.
The Prism framework was further elaborated by identifying components of each determinant,
incorporating a data handling process, and developing explicit relationships among them by
Aqil et al[] 7]. They renamed the framework as the PRISM (Performance of Routine
Information Systems Management) Framework. In the new framework, the data handling
process is classified into seven distinct steps and is shown in Figure 2 as RHIS Processes; the
seven steps include data collection, data transmission, data processing, data analysis, data
display, data quality checking, and feedback. This breakdown allows users of the framework
to identify potential weaknesses at each step, so that users can develop focused interventions.
We used the PRISM Framework as a basis to develop an analytical framework to analyze the
hospital information system.
Case Study - Performance Evaluation of OR Case Delay Code at a teaching hospital
Study site
This study was conducted as part of research collaboration efforts between Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management, and a teaching hospital in the
Boston area to improve the efficiency of operating rooms (OR). Founded in the late 19th
century, the participating hospital is the oldest and largest hospital in New England[18]. The
hospital has approximately 900 beds and has 38 main ORs and ten same-day surgery ORs[ 18].
In 2005, the hospital performed 35,000 cases of surgery. The OR Administration department
is responsible for the management of both groups of ORs[ 18].
OR Case Delay Code
The OR Case Delay Code is an application embedded within the Perioperative Record
application (Peri-Op). The main function of the OR Case Delay Code is to record the length
of the time delay in case delays, as well as the cause of the delay.
The OR Case Delay Code was originally introduced as the "OR Times" application in 1998
and was designed to capture how time progresses as the patient moves through various
activities in the OR, such as the length of time between patient arrival at the OR, to readying
the patient for surgery, to beginning the first procedure, to ending the procedure, to the
patient's departure from the OR, as well as recording any causes for a delay[ 19]. Prior to the
introduction of the OR Times, this information was manually collected by circulating nurses
using the Circulating Sheet. It was expected that the conversion from the paper system to an
on-line system would eliminate the double entry of data and information on causes of
delay[19]. The Information Technology group at the hospital carried out the software
development, and the OR Administration acted as the client for the development. The OR
Times was accompanied by the OR Times Application End-User Documentation, which
provided step-by-step instructions on how to use the software. The OR Times software
consisted of two basic display screens: the OR Times Grid and the OR Times (Figure 2 and 3,
respectively)[20]. The OR Times Grid (Figure 2) displayed scheduled surgery cases with the
estimated length of time needed for each OR room. Basic case information such as the
patient's name, medical record number, the surgeon's name, and the primary procedures are
also shown on the grid. The OR Times (Figure 3) is used to record the progress of the
patient's activities and the causes of a delay, if any. Delay causes were coded and allowed
users access to a drop-down menu from which to select up to three delay codes[19, 20]. The
original list of delay codes included in the OR Times could not be located during this research.
After the introduction of the OR Times application, a new application for the Peri-Op was
developed and the OR Times application was eventually merged into the newly introduced
Peri-Op application. There was no report found on the levels of data quality or the use of the
information for the OR Times application.
In 2003, the OR Times application's functions were enhanced within the Peri-Op application.
After the enhancement, the application has come to be commonly recognized as the "OR
Delay Code" instead of the "OR Times". This enhancement was necessary to increase the
variety of options of OR delay codes. In the new version, the OR delay codes are partitioned
off into categories to help facilitate data entry and analysis. Previously, the OR Times
provided a simple list of OR delay codes without categorizing them. The new system lets
users select a category of delay code first, and then select more specific causes from the drop
down list within the selected category. These specific causes are called delay types. If an
appropriate delay type to describe the situation is not found in the list, the data entry person
selects "others" from the list and describes the situation in the "Notes" section. The end-user
manual was not created for this version of the application.
Since the major revision in 2003, the OR Delay Code application has been revised at least
four times according to programming records found during the study. These revisions were
implemented to accommodate the increased number of delay types and to correct technical
problems found during the implementation of the application. In 2003, the OR Delay Code
contained seven categories and 56 delay types. Currently, there are nine delay categories and
83 delay types.
In addition to the delay categories, the OR Delay Code classifies OR case delays into two
groups: "before delay" and "after delay". "Before delay" is a delay of a patient's arrival into
the operating room. When the time difference between the scheduled time of the arrival and
the actual is more than five minutes, the OR Delay Code application prompts the circulating
nurse to enter a delay code and set the time length of the delay. "After delay" occurs when
the actual length of time between the patient's arrival into OR and the patient's departure
from the OR is at least five minutes longer than the expected time between arrival and
departure. When this occurs, the circulating nurse is required to enter a delay code into the
"after delay' category, but the application does not automatically prompt the nurse to do so.
Lafond et al. defined routine health information as "information that is derived at regular
intervals of a year or less through mechanisms designed to meet predictable information
needs" and explained a routine health information system as a system designed to deal with
routine health information such as health services statistics and administrative and financial
data[15]. The OR Delay Code collects and uses health services related data (surgery case
delays and their causes) and information is routinely derived from the collected data with the
aim of improving health services (OR services). Therefore, we determined that the OR Delay
Code fits the definition of a routine health information system and that the PRISM
Framework is applicable, with some modifications, for this research.
Analytical Framework for the Performance Evaluation of OR Delay Code
The PRISM Framework was modified to produce an analytical framework for the
performance evaluation of the OR Delay Code. The stakeholders of the OR Delay Code were
consulted during the modification process. Figure 4 illustrates the analytical framework used
for this study. The subsequent section describes the framework in detail.
Inputs - Performance Determinants
Following the PRISM Framework, the factors influencing the performance of the OR Delay
Code are classified into three groups: Technical, Organizational, and Behavioral factors.
1) Technical factors
Technical determinants include issues related to software design, complexity of procedures,
selection of data variables, ease of data collection, access to information, and hardware.
2) Organizational factors
Organizational factors are divided into two groups: structural factors and socio-cultural
factors. Structural factors include formal organizational structures for information system
management as well as decision-making, assigned responsibilities for various information
management tasks such as data entry and supervision, the availability of organizational
resources, and training. Examples of socio-cultural factors include decision-making norms,
organizational culture, the informal decision-making process, participation of the stakeholders
in various information management functions, and an informal reward system.
3) Behavioral factors
Behavioral factors include knowledge, competency, and motivation. Examples of behavioral
factors include the demand for data, various information management skills such as data
quality check, problem solving, and analytical skills, competency in data handling, confidence
level for data quality, and motivation for information management related tasks.
Information Management Process
Lippeveld et al. classified information management into seven steps[21 ]: data collection, data
transmission, data processing, data analysis, data display, data quality checking, and feedback.
The framework implies that the performance determinants directly and indirectly influence all
steps of the information management process. Each step needs to function well to improve
the overall performance of the information system.
The Relationship between performance determinants and the information system management
process
Each determinant factor directly influences the information management process. In addition
to having a direct influence on the process, technical factors and organizational factors
indirectly influence the process through their influence on behavioral factors. For example,
complex data collection software (a technical factor) directly affects the complexity of the
data collection process (information management process) but it also affects the motivation of
data collectors (behavioral factor). Another example can be found of the indirect influence of
organizational factors. If an organization does not give importance to evidence-based
decision-making (organizational factor), members of the organization might lose interest in
maintaining a functional information system (behavioral factor). In addition to the above
relationships, technical factors and organizational factors also influence each other.
Outputs - Performance of Information System
The performance of the information system - the OR Delay Code - is defined as the
production of high quality data and the use of this information for decision-making. It is
often perceived that high quality data are a prerequisite to the actual use of the information.
In actuality, the use of the information is often considered a key to improving the quality of
the data. In our analytical framework, these two performance factors form a reinforcing loop.
High quality data increases the use of the information and the frequent use of the information
positively influences the data quality. One the other hand, low quality data decreases the use
of the information and consequently, negatively affects the quality of the data. The zest of
this analytical framework is to identify factors that would reinforce the positive loop between
these two performance factors of the information system.
Outcome and Impact
After interviewing the key stakeholders of the OR Delay Code, it was decided that the
expected outcome of the improved performance of the information system would be defined
as the improved efficiency of OR management. Improving the efficiency of OR management
will help the OR group to achieve its mission (Impact). The mission of the OR is expected to
be in line with the mission of the hospital. Currently, the mission of OR management is in a
process of development, but is intended to include a provision for high quality service, patient
safety, and the promotion of academic advancement.
Study Methodology
This study has been carried out as a thesis project for the MIT Sloan School of Management,
Sloan Fellows Program in Innovation and Global Leadership. It is part of a collaborative
research project between the participating teaching hospital and the MIT Sloan School of
Management to study OR efficiency at the participating Boston area teaching hospital.
Data Quality
To perform a review of data quality, we analyzed the OR Delay Code data from September
2005 to August 2006. Surgery cases conducted at the main OR, Same-Day Surgery Unit
(SDSU), and the west wing facility OR were included in this analysis. The numbers of
operating rooms for each facility include 38 for the Main OR, ten for the SDSU, and three for
the west wing facility.
"Quality" of data is an elusive term that must be defined. The PRISM Framework breaks
down "quality" into four components: accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance[22].
Accuracy: Data are considered "accurate" when data reasonably captures actual
situations[22]. One way to test the accuracy of data in a database is to compare them to
information obtained through observations by third party observers. When the level of
similarity between the data in the database and the observation done by the third party is high,
the level of accuracy is considered high. In this study, however, the short period of time
allocated for the field research prohibited such an observational study. Instead, qualitative
approaches such as key informant interviews and focus group discussions were applied in
order to understand the level of the perceived accuracy of the data amongst the stakeholders.
In addition to the assessment of the perceived quality of the data, we used a proxy measure of
accuracy by examining the incidence of misclassification of actual delay incidents by
assigning "other" as the delay type, when using more specific existing delay types would be
more appropriate. Comments associated with "other" code were reevaluated to examine the
incidence of misclassification.
Timeliness: Timeliness of data can be interpreted as "most updated", "well-timed", or
"available when needed"[22]. In the case of the OR Delay Code, the data entered into the
database are frequently compiled and made available online in the form of the OR Stats
Analysis System. In addition to the online availability of data, the data analyst of the OR
Administration department provides technical support to ensure the availability of data when
required. Therefore, timeliness is not a major factor in determining the quality of data in this
study.
Completeness: Completeness could be defined in two ways; one is the coverage of
information being collected and another is the level of completion in data collection[22]. The
coverage measures how comprehensively the OR Delay Codes collect information on OR
delays. This definition of completeness is considered as part of "relevance" and associated
with the design of the database. The definition of "relevance" is discussed below. It will be
examined as part of the technical factors. The second definition is the level of completion,
which is determined by the frequency of missing data variables and, to some extent, the use of
"other" as a delay type.
Relevance: Data collected need to be relevant to the decision that needs to be made[22]. No
matter how accurate the data are, irrelevant data are not considered high quality. The
relevance of data is determined by the design of the data collection process. Selections of
data variables in the drop-down menu and the data collection mechanisms influence the
relevance of the data. The relevance will be examined and discussed as part of the technical
factors.
Perceived level of data quality: Even though the actual data quality may be high, if the
perceived level of the quality is poor, the information generated by the OR Delay Code will
not be used by stakeholders. Therefore, in this study, in addition to measuring the data
quality by the above methods, the perceived level of data quality was investigated through key
informant interviews.
Use of Information and organizational/behavioral factors
The MEASURE Evaluation Project outlined the definition of the use of information as the
following: "decision makers and stakeholders explicitly consider information in one or more
steps in the process of policymaking, program planning and management, or service provision,
even if the final decision or actions are not based on that information"[23]. Therefore, in
order to determine if the information generated from the OR Delay Code is being used, we
identified the decision makers and stakeholders pertaining to the OR Delay Code and
investigated the process of policymaking, program planning, and developing management or
service provisions through key-informant interviews.
Information is used to make a decision. The MEASURE Evaluation Project defined a
decision as "a choice that is made between two or more courses of action"[23] and further
elaborated that "these decisions are made in support of a goal". This argument is in line with
the analytical framework of this study; it is reflected in the framework that information is used
as a support in achieving an intended outcome.
Key informant interviews were also used to understand organizational and behavioral factors
affecting the performance of the OR Delay Code. An interview guide was created following
the analytical framework of the study. The interview guide is attached as Annex 1. Most
questions were open-ended questions, which allowed for an unstructured discussion on
specific topics and allowed us to gain insights into behavioral and organizational factors. The
interview was carried out over the period of seven weeks from mid-February, 2007 to mid-
April, 2007. Each interview typically lasted 45 minutes to one hour. We identified the types
of key informants needed for the interview and the OR Administration department and the
Department of Anesthesiology assisted in recruiting the informants. The number of key
informants categorized by job type is shown as Annex 2. No transcripts were made for the
interview. The interviewer reconstructed each interviewee's key points on note cards
immediately following the interview session.
Technical factors
As discussed in the analytical framework, technical factors include: the software design, the
complexity of procedures, the selection of data variables (delay code), and the ease of data
collection.
To identify relevant technical factors, we reviewed programmers' records during the
application development and revision phases, as well as analyzing user manuals and software
applications. To supplement the documented information, some of the key informant
interviews included discussion on technical factors. In order to investigate the relevance of
the OR delay types, the list of the delay types were analyzed based on their logical structure
and frequency of use.
Results
Summary of Delay Case Statistics
Number of cases in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006
In 2006, there were 35,246 cases that met the criteria of this study. Of the 35,426 cases,
16,173 cases had before delays', 14,796 cases had after delays 2, 1,111 cases did not
experience delays, and 6,654 cases experienced both before and after delays. In summary,
68.5 percent of cases during FY2006 experienced some kind of delay exceeding five minutes,
45 percent of cases experienced before delays, 47 percent experienced after delays, and 18
percent of cases experienced both before and after delays. Table 1 summarizes these results.
Delay minutes in FY2006
Table 2 summarizes the lengths of delays that occurred during FY2006. Delays often have
more than one cause. For example, the start of a surgery could be delayed by the late arrival
of a patient and by the unavailability of equipment in the operating room. The OR Delay
Code allows for the recording of more than one cause (delay type) of delay. For each delay, a
circulating nurse or a clinical service coordinating nurse determines the causes of the delay.
The nurse then assigns the length of delay for each cause (delay type). The sum of the delay
lengths for the case has to match to the total length of delay calculated by the database. In
this study, the length of the delay is calculated for each delay type in order to understand the
effect of each delay type on the length of the surgery case.
Before delay case is defined as a case where peri-operative procedures started more than
five minutes later than expected starting time of peri-operative procedures.
2 After delay case is defined as a case where peri-operative procedures finished more than
The average length of delays (both before and after delays) was 41 minutes. The average
length of before delays was 29 minutes, whereas the average length of after delays was 53
minutes. The average length of the after delays is significantly longer than the one of the
before delays (p<0.05). The total time length of case delays for FY2006 was 1,316,935
minutes. That is equivalent to more than 900 days. The total time length of before delays for
FY2006 was 478,391 minutes and the total time length of after delays was 838,544 minutes.
These numbers need to be carefully interpreted because they do not necessarily mean that the
OR experienced a time waste equal to 900 days. For example, the length of time of before
delays was likely overestimated due to the logics used to calculate delay minutes. Also, there
were many cases that completed earlier than expected and these cases compensated for the
delays caused by other cases. Similarly, shuffling operating rooms to accommodate pending
cases contributed to the reduction of actual delays. The data structure of the OR Delay Code
does not allow the analysis of overtime usage of operating rooms due to OR delays.
Delays by Surgical Services
Table 3 shows the number of cases that experienced delays in FY2006, stratified by surgical
services. Table 4 shows the same data, though in percentages. Apart from cardiac surgery
services, the average percentage of cases with delays for each surgical service category was
not significantly different from the total average. According to the data, the majority of
cardiac surgery cases started on time. Before delays happened in only 19 percent of cardiac
five minutes later than expected finish time of peri-operative procedures.
cases but, on the other hand, the majority of cardiac cases lasted longer than scheduled.
Eighty percent of cardiac surgery service cases experienced after delays.
The average time length of delays per case categorized by the surgical service is shown in
Table 5. The average length of before delays was 29 minutes and the average time length of
after delays was 53 minutes. The after delays revealed more variation in the average lengths
of delays by the category of service than the before delays revealed. Cardiac surgery service,
for example, finished an average of two hours past the projected finish time.
Delays by surgical services are further analyzed by categorizing the length of delays. For this
analysis, five groups were created: delays of less than 15 minutes, delays between 15 and 30
minutes, delays between 30 and 45 minutes, delays between 45 and 60 minutes, and delays
lasting longer than 60 minutes. Table 6 shows the number of delays categorized by service
category and the length of the delay. Table 7 shows the same data in percentages.
More than half of before delays and about a third of after delays are less than 30 minutes.
However, more than a quarter of after delays are longer than 60 minutes. Some service
categories experience a disproportionately high incidence of longer after delays. Thirteen out
of 20 service categories experienced more than 20 percent of after delays that lasted longer
than 60 minutes. This indicates that many surgery practices experience difficulty managing
their procedures within the projected time frame. In line with the previous findings, more
than two thirds of delays of Cardiac surgery services last longer than 60 minutes.
Table 8 shows the sum of the lengths of delays categorized by surgery service and grouped by
the length of delays.
Delay Code analysis - Causes of Delays
The number of delay incidences and causes of delays
The chart X shows the distribution of after delay incidences by delay code categories. The
Surgeon/surgical category is responsible for two thirds of the after delay cases followed by
the Anesthesia category, which is responsible for 14 percent. On the other hand, the
Scheduling category is the major cause of the before delays. It is responsible for 42 percent
of before delay cases followed by the Anesthesia category, which is responsible for 15 percent.
An analysis of after delay cases in the surgeon/surgical category revealed that 90 percent of
these delays are classified as "procedure longer than booked". Furthermore, after delays
coded as "procedure longer than booked" make up 57 percent of all after delay cases.
In before delay cases, "previous case delay" is the most frequently used delay type. This
delay type appears in the two separate OR Delay Code categories; once in the Administrative
category and once again in the Scheduling category. Combined, 35 percent of before delay
cases are attributed to a "previous case delay" in the OR Delay Code.
The length of delay by OR Delay Code
The average length of delays was calculated for each category and delay type. Table 9 (1-4)
shows the number of delays by delay category and type. Table 10 (1-4) shows the average
lengths by delay category and delay type. In the before delays, the radiology/other ancillary
category has relatively long delays, although the incidence of delays in this category is low.
Similarly, "organ donor delay" and "bumped for other emergency cases" delay types cause
longer delays, though the incidence of these delays is low.
In the after delay categories, "organ donor delay" causes a delay of almost two hours when it
occurs. Among other delay types in the surgeon/surgical category, "procedure complication",
"procedure added", "procedure change", "procedure longer than booked", "resident late", and
"site verification" all have delays of longer than 60 minutes per incident. Other significant
delay lengths are observed for "waiting for ICU bed availability" and "patient complication"
delay types.
The delay time length was categorized into five groups depending on the time lost to the
delay: less than 15 minutes, between 15 and 30 minutes, between 30 and 45 minutes, between
45 and 60 minutes, and longer than 60 minutes. For each group, delay lengths and the sum of
the delay lengths was calculated and presented in Table 11, classified by the delay type.
Highlighted cells in Table 11 illustrate the worst ten delay types in regards to the total sum of
delay length in minutes.
Scheduling related causes for delay, such as "previous case delay", "scheduling change", and
"double booking of surgeries" are responsible for 50 percent of the total time length of before
delays. Another finding revealed that delays categorized as "others" are significant sources of
before delays, especially in Anesthesia, Patient, and Scheduling categories. The "others" will
be further discussed as part of the data quality analysis.
The most significant delay type is "procedure longer than booked". Two thirds of all after
delays are due to "procedure longer than booked". Combined with other procedure associated
reasons, this group contributes 72 percent of the after delay minutes.
Performance of the OR Delay Code Database
The analytical framework applied for this study defines the performance of the OR Delay
Code as the production of high quality data and the use of the information it generates. The
quality of the data is ascertained by examining the accuracy and completeness of the data in
the OR Delay Code. In addition, the perceived level of data quality amongst stakeholders is
also investigated.
Analysis on Data Quality
Analysis of "Other" as Delay Code
When stakeholders were asked their opinions on the quality of data generated from the OR
Delay Code, all of them stated that the data quality was poor. They often attributed the poor
quality to the frequent use of "other" as the reason of delays. Respondents' perceived level of
the frequency of use of the delay type "others" in the OR Delay Code varied significantly,
ranging from 10 percent to 30 percent. Some respondents identified the monthly consolidated
report on OR utilization as the source of their information. Some also mentioned the internal
review of the OR Delay Code data carried out by Seim et al. in 2006 as the source of their
information. However, the majority formed their impressions based on the hearsay of the OR
Delay Code data quality. Regardless of the sources of the stakeholders' information, "other"
is considered a symbol of poor data quality. This section provides a detailed analysis of the
delay type "other" in the OR Delay Code.
Among all delay types, "other" is the second most frequently used type. It was used for 20
percent of before delays and 11 percent of after delays in FY2006. Only "previous case
delay" was used more frequently for before delays and "procedure longer than booked" for
after delays. Although this information confirms the stakeholders' concerns about the over-
use of "other", our analysis reveals that the frequency of the use of "other" as a delay type
significantly differs among OR delay categories and, in some categories, the use of "other"
does not preclude the usefulness of information from the OR Delay Code in improving OR
delays. Table 12 shows the proportion of the use of "other" in each delay category. It ranged
from five percent in the Scheduling category to 49 percent in the Anesthesia category in
before delays, and from two percent in the Surgeon/Surgical category to 100% in the
"Nursing category" in after delays. The incidence of the use of "other" in several categories
is within a reasonable range, indicating that the overall high usage of "other" does not directly
relate to the usefulness of the OR delay data. For example, an analysis of the data in the
Surgeons/Surgical category indicated a very high incidence of "procedure longer than
booked". This information provides enough evidence to warrant a detailed investigation to
determine why procedures are running longer than originally anticipated.
Seim et al. examined comments associated with the use of "other" as a delay code in
November 2006 and found that 59% of "other" delay types could have been identified as one
of the definitive delay codes in the current category system[24]. We conducted a similar
analysis for the OR Delay Code data in FY2006 by randomly selecting 20 percent of before
delays that were coded as "other". There were 3,195 before delays reported in the OR Delay
Code during the period. Six hundred sixty seven incidents were, therefore, randomly selected
and the comments associated with the delay were analyzed for content.
Three hundred twenty four "other" responses, or 48.5 percent of all "other" responses, were
able to be reassigned to a definite delay type within the existing delay code system.
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that this figure is likely to be an underestimate of the
incorrect use of "other" as a delay type. One hundred eighty six, or 27.7 percent, of "other"
delay types were not accompanied by comments, rendering the reclassification of delays
impossible. Assuming that the proportion of "other" delay types that could be reclassified as
definite types is consistent with the "other" delay types that have no identifying comments,
we estimated that 125 of"other" delay types without comments could have been reclassified.
By adding these 125 "other" types to the previous result, we concluded that two thirds of all
"other" delay types could have been reclassified as definite delay types.
A review of the comments in the "other" delay types also revealed a pattern in which specific
types of delays were classified as "other" by nurses. For example, some nurses tried to find
delay types such as "interpreter services", "previous case delays", and "paper work related" in
a category other than the "Administrative" category. Because they could not find these types
in the other categories, they assigned "other" code rather than trying to find the correct
category. Similarly, many I.V. related delays and A-line related delays were classified as
"other". These cases indicate unfamiliarity with the delay code structure among nurses. In
order to assign an appropriate delay type to describe a delay, nurses must first pick the
category within which the delay type can be found. If a nurse picks the wrong category, then
the right delay type will not appear in that category's drop-down list and the nurse will most
likely resolve to pick "other" as the delay type in order to save time.
Missing data variables
Another definition of data quality is the level of completion in the data collection. This is
measured by the proportion of data variables that are left uncollected. In FY2006, all data
variables were collected, and thus, the completeness of the data variables was excellent.
Spelling of nurse's name in the Peri-Op database
The original analysis plan included the analysis of the use of "other" as a delay type, stratified
by nurses' names to see if there was a pattern in use of "other" by certain users. However,
this analysis turned out to be very difficult due to the wide variations in the spelling of nurse's
names. In the Peri-Op application, a nurse types his/her name for each surgery case. The
name entered into the Peri-Op is linked to the OR Delay Code for analysis by using case ID
numbers as a primary key. We found that many nurses spelled their names in varying ways.
It was very common to find a nurse with more than ten variations in the spelling of his/her
name. A couple of nurses had more than 20 variations in the spelling of his/her name in 2006.
This is not directly part of our assessment of the data quality of the OR Delay Code, and this
variation made our analysis difficult. It should be noted that the spelling of physicians' names
also varied.
Perceived level of data quality
All respondents in the study perceived that the level of data quality of the OR Delay Code was
poor. Even data collectors such as the OR circulating nurses and the OR Clinical Service
Coordinators considered the data to be of poor quality. They described the data quality as:
- Junk-in, Junk-out
- The data has so many "other" types, how we could use them?
- We usually have two or three favorite delay codes to select, so that we don't need to spend
time on it. There are other tasks that require our immediate attention.
- The delay code does not give a detailed, comprehensive, illustrative picture of why delays
happen in OR
When the basis for their perceptions was asked, some respondents mentioned rumor or an
overall general perception as the reason. They said "we heard that the data quality was bad"
or "'we heard that there were so many "other" types as the reason for delay that made the
quality poor." Other responses questioned if nurses are in the best position to document
delays.
Frequently cited responses that are related nurses' credibility as data collectors include:
- Surgeons intimidate nurses; therefore nurses do not blame delays on surgeons.
- Nurses are not in the best position to see the whole picture; therefore their input would be
biased.
- There are three forces in the OR: surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses. Each group
does not want to take blame for delays. Also, nurses have a conflict of interest; nurses
would not blame themselves as the cause of delay.
- Nurses want to minimize time spent on the OR Delay Code; therefore they pick codes
which are as general as possible to describe the situation. "There are so many things to be
done at the OR."
- Nobody gives feedback to nurses about their job on the OR Delay Code, so they think it is
not a priority.
- "No matter how much effort spent on data collection, we do not see changes."
These responses were further analyzed in order to understand technical, organizational, and
behavioral factors influencing the performance of the OR Delay Code.
Analysis on Information Use
As described in the methodology section, the key steps in understanding the level of
information use are to identify 1) the expected outcome or purpose of the OR Delay Code, 2)
stakeholders and decision-makers, and 3) the process of policymaking, program planning and
management, or service provisions. In the key informant interviews, questions were asked to
identify these elements of information use.
Expected outcomes/purpose of OR Delay Code
When respondents were asked what they thought constituted the purpose of the OR Delay
Code, they uniformly identified efficiency improvement of the OR as the Code's purpose.
Efficiency is an elusive term and, therefore, respondents were asked to elaborate on their
understanding of the "efficiency" that the OR Delay Code is expected to improve. Responses
varied. A few senior level respondents mentioned that efficiency was important to achieve
the mission of the hospital as an academic institution by improving utilization and facilitating
the growth of service provisions. These respondents thought that financial efficiency was
important but was not the top priority issue. However, this view on efficiency was not shared
by the majority of the respondents in the study. The rest of respondents identified efficiency
as financial efficiency. "Time is money" is the most common phrase respondents used to
describe the purpose of the Delay Code. Although none of respondents could point out any
particular senior executives or specific directives stating that financial efficiency is a major
issue in OR efficiency, many said that they felt strong pressure from "hospital higher-ups" to
improve financial efficiency by reducing costs and/or by "doing more cases".
Respondents were also asked if OR delays are major problems that need to be solved
immediately. Many thought delays were an important problem but that they are only one of
the many issues that need to be addressed. Several respondents said that "even though we
experience delays everyday, we manage to finish the things we are supposed to do at the end
of the day". OR delay was more frequently identified as an "annoyance". On the other hand
the safety of patients was considered a priority issue by all respondents.
Stakeholders and Decision-makers
Stakeholders of the OR Delay Code were identified as nurses, officers at the OR
Administration, hospital management, surgeons and surgeons' office administrators,
anesthesiologists, and other OR related departments such as the Post Anesthetic Care Unit
(PACU) and the Same Day Surgery Unit (SDSU). Among them, four groups, i.e. nurses,
surgeons, anesthesiologists, and the OR Administration, are identified as the main
stakeholders of the database.
Decision-makers are people who make a choice between two or more courses of action[23].
These actions support the purpose of the OR Delay Code. Since the OR Delay Code's
purpose is to improve the efficiency of the OR, it can be safely assumed that the decision-
makers of the OR Delay Code are those who make decisions about policy, management, and
service provisions pertaining to OR efficiency. However, it became clear from interviews that,
in the case of decisions pertaining to the OR Delay Code and the OR efficiency, there was no
single decision-maker or a decision-making body that people recognized. Rather, in the case
of dealing with OR delays, all stakeholders felt that they had various degrees of decision-
making responsibilities. The problem was that these assumed responsibilities were implicit
and the recognized roles and responsibilities varied from one person to another, even among
respondents within a same job group. Due to the lack of clarity in the objective of OR
efficiency, alignment between the objective and the decision-making responsibilities was
weak.
As a result, decision-makers for OR efficiency became vague, conceptual beings. One nurse
described decision-makers for OR efficiency as "they", but when requested to elaborate on
the identification of "they", the nurse said "they" were those who were high-up in the ladder,
but "they" remained nameless. The nurse said "they are the ones who make us collect OR
delay data and who make decisions on them". Similar sentiment was expressed by several
other nurses. At the same time, these nurses also acknowledged that they initiate day-to-day
actions to remedy problems without using information from the OR Delay Code, but they did
not see themselves as decision-makers.
Another example of the absence of an explicit decision-maker can be seen in the discrepancy
between the roles of OR Administration as perceived by OR Administration and by others.
The OR Delay Code is developed and maintained by OR Administration. Therefore,
decision-making on OR Delay Code maintenance is clearly within the department. In regards
to using the information generated by the OR Delay Code, however, the OR Administration
views itself as an information channel to other stakeholders such as surgeons, but does not
view itself as a decision-maker. Its perceived roles included analysis of data, provision of
information, and facilitation of discussion by surgeons. On the other hand, many thought the
OR Administration should be a major decision-maker on OR delays. Surgeons seemed to
view themselves as decision-makers but they also thought that their decisions were only
applicable within their service areas.
Process of decision-making
Some surgery services are more active in looking at delay information than others. For
example, the orthopedic service has established "Operating Improvement Group" where delay
data were reportedly discussed with certain regularity. The orthopedic service was motivated
to look into the delay issues because of the wide variety of instruments they use. We were
informed that these operating improvement groups were established for all services at one
point but only the improvement group at the orthopedic service was still active.
If different decision-makers are present in an organization without defined boundaries of
decision-making responsibilities, the lack of structure may create pockets and overlaps of
decision-making. This makes decision-making for efficiency improvement ineffective. One
way of addressing this problem is establishing an organizational structure to coordinate
decisions and supervise the implementation of actions. A committee for "patient safety" is a
good example of a formal decision-making structure. While efficiency is identified as another
priority issue, it lacks such a central mechanism to coordinate efforts. This lack of a formal
decision-making structure for what is supposedly a priority issue sends a signal to
stakeholders that the issue is indeed not a priority.
Even without a formal structure, decision-making could be improved by setting a clear
objective for OR efficiency. The alignment of stakeholders under a clear objective would
help decision-making by empowering the decision-makers[25].
In summary, we found that although delays are considered a problem by many, they are not a
real priority. While all agreed that "efficiency" is important to OR management and the OR
Delay Code's purpose is to improve this "efficiency," but there was no explicit agreement on
what constitutes "efficiency" and how exactly the OR Delay Code contributes to improving
the efficiency. There are many implicit decision-makers/groups but the boundaries of their
decision-making responsibilities over efficiency improvement are not clear. A formal
structure to coordinate decision-making is also absent.
Information management process and the use of information
The analytical framework implies that a well functioning information management process is
essential for the effective use of information. One of the key information management steps
to facilitate information use is the distribution of information. The OR Delay Code has three
main outlets of information: monthly consolidated reports on OR utilization published by the
OR Administration, OR Stats Analysis System - an online OR statistics analysis tool and
occasional service specific information compiled by the OR Administration. In addition,
there are some instances when users actively seek information on OR delays by contacting the
OR Administration.
A monthly OR report is compiled by the OR Administration and contains a variety of data
pertaining to the utilization of the OR, such as case volume and block time utilization. It also
contains information on first case (of the day) starts summary, top ten Peri-Op delay codes,
average turn-over times, and accuracy in predicting the length of scheduled cases. The
distribution list of the report includes 71 individuals at the hospital. Several recipients of the
report acted as the key informants in our study. While these key informants acknowledged
the receipts of the report, only a few of them said that they actively used the information on
delays found in the report. One of the senior management level respondents reported poor
quality of data as the reason for the lack of interest in reviewing the data in the report.
The second outlet of information in the OR Delay Code is the OR Stats Analysis System. The
system allows on-line queries of OR service statistics, including the data from the OR Delay
Code. The data in the system are updated monthly. OR Administration controls the access to
the system and currently about 30 people at the hospital have access. It is expected that the
number of active users of the OR Stats Analysis System is much lower than 30 according to a
couple of respondents from the OR Administration.
The third outlet is information compiled for annual or semi-annual meetings of surgical
services. This outlet might lead to the most active use of OR delay information, though the
access to this information seems limited to a few surgeons. When our respondents from
surgery services were asked about their use of delay information, both surgeons admitted that
they had not seen the information compiled by the OR Administration, though they said OR
delays were frequently discussed at their department meetings.
Another key information management step that has a significant impact on data quality is
feedback on the information to all levels of stakeholders, including the data collectors.
Information feedback must be provided to data collectors and their supervisors, so that
corrective actions can be taken to improve data quality and stimulate the use of the
information.
When we asked nurses about feedback on the OR Delay Code, those interviewed responded
that they have never received formal feedback on the OR Delay Code as far as they could
remember. All but one nurse interviewed had worked at the hospital longer than ten years,
thus, this indicates that no formal feedback was given to data collectors since the introduction
of the OR Times. One exception was a Clinical Service Coordinator of the orthopedic service,
who is a member of the orthopedic operating improvement group. The nurse reported
frequently reviewing the data. Other interviewed nurses said that they have talked about OR
delays at their staff meetings but no formal feedbacks were given on the situation of OR
delays or the data quality of the OR Delay Code that they entered. They felt that no actions
came out as a result of the OR Delay Code. When they were asked what motivated them to
enter delay data, they responded that they had to enter OR delay data in order to use the Peri-
Op application to enter other critical peri-operative data; the majority of them saw the Delay
Code as a necessary but annoying process on which they wanted to spend minimum time.
Verdict: Performance of the OR Delay Code
Our study concurs with the general perception among stakeholders on the performance of the
OR Delay Code: the performance in terms of the data quality and the information use are both
poor. However, we also found that not all data in the OR Delay Code are useless. Analysis
of the current data could produce valuable information to develop initiatives for OR efficiency
improvement, but there is very little evidence to show that even the useful information would
be actively used.
Determinants of the performance of Delay Code Database
The analytical framework of the study identified technical, behavioral, and organizational
factors as determinants of the performance of the OR Delay Code Database. This section
discusses each determinant based on the findings from key informant interviews, focus group
discussions, and document reviews.
Negative feedback loop between low data quality and low level of information use
We observed the existence of a negative feedback loop between the perceived poor data
quality and the low level of information use. Stakeholders responded that they would not
consider using the OR Delay Code information because they believed that the data quality
was low in general and that the data would not present an accurate picture or provide enough
detailed information. On the other hand, the data collectors felt that their efforts did not
translate into any tangible actions to reduce the delays. The lack of actions enhanced their
perception that OR delays were an annoyance but not a priority problem. The low quality of
the data further reduces the motivation to use the information and a lack of action further
marginalizes the data collection within many conflicting, time demanding tasks. In short, at
the current stage, the OR Delay Code's performance is in a negative feedback loop. Three
factors - technical, organizational, and behavioral factors - that influence this negative
performance loop are examined in the following section.
Technical Factors
This study found three technical factors which influenced the performance of the OR Delay
Code. The three factors are the data entry software design, the relevance of delay types
included in the database, and the access to OR delay information.
OR delay data entry design
OR delay codes are structured in two tiers: the OR delay code categories and the OR delay
types. When a delay of more than five minutes happens in an OR case, the OR Delay Code
application prompts a nurse to enter an OR delay code to describe the cause of the delay. The
nurse first selects the OR delay code category from a drop-down list and subsequently selects
an OR delay type from another drop-down list associated with the selected category. There
are nine delay code categories and 82 delay types in the database. Delay types are also
assigned as "before delay", "after delay", or "both" depending on what time portion of the OR
case schedule that the delay affects. Delays that affect the start time of an OR case are
considered "before delay". "After" delay types affect the duration of the procedure. Some
delay types can affect both the start time and the duration; these types are considered "both".
For example, "patient late to the hospital" influences the start time; therefore it is assigned
"before". When a delay happens, the Peri-Op Application automatically determines if the
delay is before or after and displays only those delay types as options. For example, if a
surgeon was late to the OR, that would delay the start time of the procedure. When a nurse
enters the delay information in the OR Delay Code, the application only gives the options of
"before" and "both" delay types within the surgeon/surgical delay category. The application
allows up to three OR delay types per case.
Nurses' knowledge on available delay types and their associated categories is a prerequisite
for this process to work properly. In theory, a nurse can go through categories one by one
until he/she finds an appropriate delay type to describe the delay cause but various evidence
shows that nurses do not spend the time looking for an appropriate delay type. During a focus
group discussion with OR nurses, they admitted that they would rather spend less time on the
OR Delay Code and that they have developed a list of their "favorite" delay types and their
locations in the OR Delay Code application. This allows them to quickly finish their work in
the OR Delay Code data entry screen. They also admitted that, if the situation could not be
described by their "favorite" types, they would rather use "other" than spend the time looking
for a more appropriate delay type. This explains the high proportion of "other" types listed in
inappropriate categories that could have been assigned definite delay types in the OR Delay
Code.
Definition of OR delay
The analysis of FY2006 OR delays revealed that more than a third of "before" delays were
attributed to "previous case delay". "Before" delay is defined as a delay of five minutes or
more between the Peri-Op into OR time and the Peri-Op Adjusted Start time)[26]. If the
duration of the previous case is longer than expected, the subsequent cases' start times should
be pushed to later times. If the OR Delay Code adjusts the start time of the subsequent cases
according to the finish time of the previous case, that would eliminate "previous case delay"
as the reason for a "before delay." The frequent use of "previous case delay", therefore,
suggests two plausible problems with the OR Delay Code: one explanation is a bug in the
Peri-Op application that does not automatically adjust the start times of subsequent cases, thus
creating artificial delays when no real delays exist. Another explanation is that nurses do not
understand that this automatic adjustment happens; therefore, when they are prompted to enter
delay codes by the application, they pick "previous case delay" as the reason rather than the
true reason for the delay.
Relevance of OR Delay Code variables
Interviews with nurses revealed that nurses have their favorite delay codes. Nurses
acknowledged that their favorite codes had as "broad a meaning as possible", so that their
entries "might not be precise, but they are not wrong either". Upon reviewing the delay types
used in the OR Delay Code, we found a flawed logical structure. One logical flaw is the
hierarchical structure of delay types within a category. Some delay types are the cause of
other delay types, even though they are at the same level on the hierarchical structure. The
most commonly used type in the Administrative category is "paperwork (consent, etc) issues".
This is often caused by the unavailability of "interpreter services". In this example, it is
sufficient enough for nurses to remember the location of "paperwork issues". There is no way
of knowing how severe the problem of the unavailability of "interpreter services" truly is in
OR time management from the OR Delay Code data. A similar example of a flaw across
different categories is when surgeons are not informed of a time change (Scheduling category)
and come into the OR late (Surgeon/surgical category). If a nurse feels intimidated by a
surgeon, the nurse might select "surgeon not informed of time change" but others might select
"surgeon late" because he/she might be used to using that delay type.
Ideally, delay codes should be mutually exclusive in describing causes of the delay; otherwise
the same problem can be classified into different types. However, in the current delay type
structure, a delay event can be described by using different delay types with various degrees
of specificity. For example, the surgeon/surgical category includes 14 delay types. Some of
the 14 types describe relatively specific situations, such as "patient positioning", "procedure
added", "sponge/instrument unaccounted for", and "procedure complication". If any of these
situations happen, they generally lead to "procedure longer than booked", which is the most
commonly used delay code in the database.
Another problem with the OR delay types is the duplication of the same delay types in
different categories. "Previous case delay" can be found in both the Administrative category
and the Scheduling category. "Case set-up delay" is in the Nursing category and the
Turnover/transport category. "MOR PACU Waitlist" and "SDSU recovery room delay" can
be found in both the Administrative and Turnover/transport categories. Although this
arrangement could have been made intentionally to allow nurses to pick the same type from
the different categories, due to the lack of definitions of delay types there is not way to
confirm whether this was intentional.
Deciding on an appropriate number of OR delay types is difficult, but it is clear from our
analysis that some delay types are rarely used and may be unnecessary. Twelve out of 82
delay types were used less than ten times in FY2006. There are other five delay types that
were used less than 20 times. There was also one delay type, "RUTH's delay code", that was
never used and the nurses interviewed had never heard of it.
There is a strong demand among senior managers for comprehensive and detailed information
that would allow stakeholders to identify the root causes of delays. For example, a surgeon
interviewed mentioned that OR delay information must be illustrative enough to identify the
causes of delays so that preventative actions could be taken. The surgeon expressed his
concern that even if the quality improves for the existing OR Delay Code, knowing simple
descriptive statistics such as the percentage of surgeons late to surgery was not sufficiently
illustrative to provide insight into the causes of those late arrivals. Although the demand for
comprehensive data is understandable, it would significantly increase resource requirements.
It is, therefore, important to find a balance between the comprehensiveness of data and the
time and resource requirements when selecting the data variables, by considering the
frequency of the information use and other data collection methods, rather than just a routine
information collection mechanism such as the OR Delay Code.
The relevance of data variables is measured against the goal of the organization. This means
that the purpose of having the OR Delay Code should determine what data variables are to be
collected. As previously discussed, the purpose of the OR Delay Code is efficiency
improvement but no clear guidance is given as to what kind of efficiency it aims to improve.
If financial efficiency is the main theme, the data variables in the OR Delay Code should
reflect that intention by selecting variables that are focused on delays with significant
financial implications. For example, if the cost of turnover delays between cases is
considered financially significant, the OR should consider monitoring turnover times with
substantial detail rather than monitoring OR case lengths.
In summary, the overall data quality of the OR Delay Code from a relevance perspective is
poor. Once the purpose of the OR Delay Code is explicitly defined, it is important to review
the delay types for their relevance, logic, frequency of use, mutual exclusivity, and method of
collection.
Access to OR Delay Data
For all stakeholders, accessing OR delay information is a cumbersome process. They are
required to 1) wait for monthly consolidated reports on OR utilization, 2) request access to the
OR Stats Analysis System and conduct their own analysis, or 3) request information from the
OR Administration and wait for their response. The monthly report is perhaps the easiest
method to access information, but that information is limited to four prescribed indicators
related to OR delays. Users of the OR Stats Analysis System are required to have some level
of familiarity with query operation of databases and the system lacks graphical display
functions. Having such a limited access to information negatively affects the motivation to
use that information.
Behavioral Factors
According to Aqil et al., behavioral factors include an individual's knowledge and skills,
motivation, and confidence regarding information management and the use of information[22].
Knowledge and skills among nurses
We found that the level of knowledge on how to handle OR delay code data varied
considerably even among nurses who have been at the hospital's OR for more than five years.
For example, some nurses did not know that they could enter more than one delay code per
case. The OR Delay Code does not come with a user manual describing data collection
procedures or definitions of delay codes. No formal training on the OR Delay Code is
instituted. Nurses learn "from preceptor 3 , on the job". This means that the knowledge and
skills of nurses in using the OR Delay Code is determined either by the level of knowledge
and skills of their preceptors, by self-teaching, or both.
As discussed earlier, the majority of nurses see entering delay codes as an annoyance rather
than an essential task. One nurse reasoned that if this were an essential task, then there would
be more action to improve the situation in OR, but since that had not happened the OR Delay
Code must not be that important. This inaction lowers the level of motivation among nurses
to properly enter OR delay data. Similarly, the lack of feedback to nurses on their OR Delay
Code related work, such as the quality of their data entry, negatively affects their motivation
level.
Behavioral factors also affect the usage of information generated by the OR Delay Code.
This study confirmed problems with the data quality, such as frequent use of "other," but it
also demonstrated that an analysis of existing data could produce information relevant to
3 Preceptor is a nurse who provides on-the-job training to incoming nurses.
improving OR efficiency. In spite of its actual usefulness, the perceived usefulness of the
data was severely affected by the belief that the quality of data was poor.
The low confidence in the quality of the data seems to stem from the lack of confidence
among some stakeholders on nurses' credibility to make accurate and objective judgment
regarding the causes of OR delays. During an interview, one surgeon mentioned that "nurses
would not blame OR delays on themselves." This sentiment was not limited to this surgeon
alone, but was expressed by several interviewees. Some also cited nurses' feelings of
intimidation around surgeons as the reason for nurses' inability to record accurate information
about delays, especially when those delays were caused by surgeons. While most nurses
assured us of their objectivity in determining delay causes, some acknowledged that they have
felt intimidated by surgeons in the past, and some avoided using surgeon-related delay types
even if surgeons caused the delays.
Nurses also questioned whether they should be the sole group to record delay codes. In some
cases, OR delays are a consequence of events occurring outside of the OR. Limiting data
collection to OR nurses will limit the coverage of information. It may also foster a sense of
unfairness because OR nurses feel they are being held responsible for things beyond their
control.
Organizational Factors
Organizational structure, rules, practices, and culture have a strong influence on information
system users[22]. There are two types of organizational factors discussed in this study:
structural organizational factors and socio-cultural organizational factors.
Influence of Structural organizational factors
The absence of a formal mechanism to coordinate the decision-making process on efficiency
improvement was discussed earlier. This absence impairs the use of information generated
from the OR Delay Code.
Training for data collection and entry
Ensuring that all data collectors have the proper skills for collecting data is the responsibility
of an organization. A training program is essential to ensure a minimum level of skill among
data collectors and to standardize procedures. As previously discussed, there is no systematic
training program in place for the OR Delay Code.
Another way to support data collectors is to provide a user manual with a glossary of delay
codes. Although it is unlikely that nurses will consult the manual while entering the data,
documenting explicit definitions of each delay type would be an asset to the training program.
Supervision
Another organizational intervention to ensure proper data entry is supervision. There is no
system of supervision in place for tasks associated with the OR Delay Code. While nurses
reported that OR delays were discussed at their staff meetings, there had not been any
opportunity to discuss their work on the OR Delay Code.
Organizational culture of information
Aqil et al. defined the culture of information as "the capacity and control to promote values
and beliefs among members of an organization for collection, analysis, and use of information
to accomplish its goals and mission"[22]. The analytical framework illustrates that
organizational culture does not only directly influence the performance of the OR Delay Code,
but it also indirectly influences the behavior of members of the organization.
Three forces in OR
Several respondents explained that the OR has three competing forces; surgeons,
anesthesiologists, and nurses. The OR Administration is often seen as an extension of the
anesthesiologist group. With respect to their accountability for OR delays and, to some extent,
OR efficiency, these three groups' interests are not necessarily aligned. Surgeons and
anesthesiologists report dissatisfaction with nurses' abilities to record accurate delay
information. Surgeons feel that "anesthesiologists do not care much if we have more cases or
not." Nurses feel that both surgeons and anesthesiologists do not want to take the blame for
the delay. Both surgeons and nurses resent that anesthesiologists have permissive attitudes
about causing delays for teaching purposes. The three forces have different perceptions of the
reasons for the failed performance of the OR Delay Code, and as one respondent said during
the interview, "none of three groups want to take blame for the problem."
Effect of an increasingly time-driven environment
Many respondents claimed that the environment of the OR is increasingly becoming more
time-driven. There is a growing sense that there has been a push to do more and more cases
over the last several years. Many used the expression "time is money" to describe their
environment and reported feeling unspoken financial pressure. Both nurses and physicians
said that "OR Administration must have been pressured from the high above." This feeling of
working in a time-driven environment should have increased the value of the OR Delay Code;
instead, it lowered it. The OR Delay Code is seen as part of the problem. "We know how to
run the place" is a frequently repeated response from nurses. This assertion implies that the
OR Delay Code does not add value in "running the place," as they have been running the OR
without major problems in the past.
Another negative effect of this time-driven culture is the surgeons' attitudes towards the OR
Delay Code. According to some nurses, some of the surgeons feel that if procedure delays
were attributed to them, then they would be reprimanded. These surgeons try to influence
which delays types the nurses choose.
Misalignment between commitment and actions
As a couple of respondents pointed out, OR delay is recognized as one of problems "that we
have to live with" but is not considered a priority problem. The importance given to an issue
can be judged by the commitment of the OR Administration and other senior stakeholders.
And the existence of commitment can be measured by the actions taken to improve the
situation. The lack of initiatives to improve OR delays confirms the general perception that
OR delay is not a priority issue.
Interviews and focus group discussions revealed that the existing organizational factors, both
structural and socio-cultural factors, are not equipped to support the proper performance of
the OR Delay Code.
Discussion
This study examined the performance of the OR Delay Code and the factors influencing its
performance. We developed an analytical framework based on the PRISM Framework to
delineate the relationship between the performance and the technical, behavioral, and
organizational factors. The performance of the OR Delay Code was defined as the production
of high quality data and the use of the information generated from that data.
Performance of the OR Delay Code - revisiting the Analytical Framework
When the analytical framework for this study was originally developed, the performance of
the OR Delay Code was defined as the production of high quality data and the use of that
information. We contemplated that these two performance elements form a reinforcing loop.
A close look at the data quality revealed that there were two types of data quality: quantitative
data quality, which could be measured with quantifiable indicators such as accuracy,
timeliness, completeness, and relevance, and qualitative data quality that are based on the
perceived level of data quality among stakeholders. The relationship between these two types
of data quality and the actual use of the generated information is illustrated in Figure 5. This
illustration indicates that both perceived data quality and quantifiable data quality
independently form a reinforcing loop with the information use, but quantifiable data quality
also influences perceived data quality.
This study confirmed that the overall performance of the OR Delay Code as determined by
quantifiable data quality, perceived data quality, and information use is poor. Although the
timeliness and the completeness of data collection were excellent, the accuracy and the
relevance of the data severely compromised the quantifiable quality of the data. The
perceived data quality was also poor; there was a dismissive feeling about the OR Delay Code
as an information system among some stakeholders. The status of information use did not
fare better. The information use was at best sporadic and there was little evidence of active
information use.
The poor performance of the OR Delay Code should not be news to the stakeholders. This
study was motivated because of concern over the perceived poor quality of data and the lack
of information use expressed by stakeholders at the hospital. This study defined and
quantified their suspicions, as well as exploring further possible explanations for the poor
performance.
Factors affecting Quantifiable Data Quality
The accuracy of the data entered into the OR Delay Code is influenced by technical factors
such as a lack of standardized procedures and definitions of delay types. The lack of
standardized procedures to determine cause(s) of delays introduces variations in the
interpretation of delay causes. This problem is aggravated by the lack of an OR Delay Code
user manual and a formal training program for data collection.
Another technical issue we identified is the selection of OR delay types. Duplications of the
same delay type across two categories, and the lack of mutual exclusivity and logical
structures created confusion and motivated nurses to adopt the practice of using "the broader,
the better" delay types.
The frequent use of "other" influenced the quality of the data and is partly driven by the
design of the data entry functions of the OR Delay Code. Although the two-tier approach in
data entry, i.e., delay category and delay type, was considered a logical approach in
accommodating the increased number of delay types by the program designers, this approach
resulted in the increase in the use of "other" by the nurses. In order for this approach to work,
nurses need to have a concrete knowledge of the structure of the delay categories and delay
types. If the category that a nurse has chosen is not the right one, the right delay type will not
be found in the drop down list of delay types. Although it is desirable that a nurse will go
through all delay categories until the correct delay type is found, this expectation seems
unrealistic in the current time-driven environment of the OR.
Behavioral factors such as knowledge, skills, and motivation influenced data collection
practices. At the same time, these behavioral factors were strongly affected by organizational
factors. Our study suggests that the lack of visible initiatives to improve OR delays implicitly
indicates that the OR Delay Code is of low priority in the organization. The lack of training
programs, supervision, and feedback negatively affected the knowledge and skills necessary
for proper data collection procedure.
Factors affecting Perceived Data Quality
Our study indicates that the level of information use correlates with the perceived level of data
quality. The current perception of poor data quality seems to originate from the following
three problems: a mismatch between the types of data being collected and the desired type of
data, hearsay about poor data quality, and a lack of confidence in the data collection
mechanism.
Mismatch between the data being collected and expected use of data
Several respondents thought that useful OR delay data were illustrative, comprehensive, and
detailed enough to perform cause-effect analysis of OR delays. From their point of view, the
current OR delay data are too broad and not illustrative enough, thus they were deemed not
useful. However, expansion of the data items in the existing OR Delay Code to satisfy these
complaints will increase human and technical requirements and the complexity of data
management. The decision for database expansion should be carefully evaluated to ascertain
the cost and the effect of such an intervention. A distinction should be made between data
items which need to be collected for every OR case and ones for which a well designed
periodical data collection is sufficient.
Hearsay about poor data quality
A general belief of poor data quality was enough for many stakeholders to stay away from
using OR Delay Code data. A guilty verdict was already passed despite the fact that many
stakeholders had no factual basis on which to judge the level of data quality. Collective
judgment on the data quality limited the use of OR delay data even when there was evidence
that the current data could have been useful. An improvement in quantifiable data quality
might not be enough to convince stakeholders to change their perceptions in a short period of
time. Interventions should not be limited to technical problems but should address
organizational issues in order to regain confidence in the data collection system.
Confidence in the Data Collection Mechanism
Unless stakeholders are convinced of the strength of the data collection system, its product,
data, will not be accepted as being of high quality. In the case of the OR Delay Code,
stakeholders question the nurses' credibility in recording objective OR delay data. There are
several possible explanations for the questioning of the nurses' credibility. Several
respondents attributed the problem to the existence of three competing forces in OR, i.e.
surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses. The culture of these three competing forces would
make nurses vulnerable to the suspicion that they had conflicts of interests.. Comments such
as "nurses would not put blame on themselves" and "the nursing category in the OR Delay
Code has only a few delay types" illustrate this underlying suspicion.
Another explanation for the questioning of nurses' credibility is related to the nurses' ability
in determining the "right" reasons for delays. Many delays are caused by a multitude of
factors. Nurses' views of these events could be different from the views of surgeons or
anesthesiologists. Due to a lack of standardized procedures, one nurse may interpret an event
differently from other nurses. This ambiguity in a mechanism designed to determine the
cause of delays creates tension among stakeholders.
The OR Delay Code records OR delays, which could be caused by events outside of OR. For
these types of events, OR nurses are clearly not in the best position to judge OR delay causes.
OR nurses feel burdened by these events because they have to guess the causes for the delay.
Finally, it is commonly believed that nurses are intimidated by surgeons so they choose not
place "blame" on surgeons for the delay. This belief is not entirely untrue and happens to
some extent. Some nurses admitted that they would never put surgeons as the reason for the
delay under any circumstance. Many more nurses admitted that they would find other reasons
to list as the delay cause, unless the problem was serious; in that case, they said they would
not hesitate to name a surgeon. This concessive attitude comes from the recognition that
harmony among the three forces is necessary to provide healthcare to patients. Some
surgeons purposely intimidate because they believe that the OR Delay Data would be used
against them for their performance assessment. Although the magnitude of this problem is
unknown, the credibility of nurses in recording accurate information is jeopardized by this
practice of compromise.
The perceived level of data quality is strongly influenced by the culture of the organization
and it will be difficult to change over a short period of time. Even if technical interventions
such as revision of OR delay types, and the introduction of a data collection training program
improve quantifiable data quality in a relatively short period of time, it will take much longer
to improve the perceived level of data quality without improving the credibility of the data
collection mechanism.
Factors affecting Information Use
An information system supports decision-making. The OR Delay Code was conceived to
support making decisions on how to improve OR efficiency. An improvement of data quality
alone would not facilitate information use. Our study found that both behavioral and
organizational factors need to be addressed to improve information use. One of the
behavioral factors was the lack of a clear understanding among stakeholders on how OR delay
information could help improve efficiency. Organizational factors that need to be addressed
include blurred boundaries of responsibilities among decision makers, a ill-defined decision-
making process, and the lack of a structural mechanism to support decision making. The
most necessary factor, however, is ambiguousness in the alignment of the mission of OR, OR
efficiency, and the OR Delay Code. A clear communication of the alignment to all
stakeholders will help empower stakeholders to use this information to make decisions by
giving them the ability to initiate decisions without vulnerability and will reduce the
probability of conflict in these initiatives[25].
Recommendations: Improving OR Delay Code
As repeatedly discussed throughout this paper, the key step to improving the OR Delay Code
is the alignment of the Code with the mission of the OR. A clear understanding of the
purpose of the OR Delay Code is critical in improving the OR delay information system,
including the software design, data variables, data collection, data collectors, and the
decision-making structure(s).
Determining whether OR delay should be a priority issue is not the purpose of this paper.
However, it became apparent from interviews with stakeholders that delay was one of more
annoying problems encountered in the OR and that this issue merits immediate attention.
We would like to propose a set of recommendations on how to improve the performance of
the OR Delay Code. We propose short-term and mid- to long-term interventions. Short term
interventions do not include major changes in the OR Delay Code, but are interventions
aimed at initiating small, but needed successes. Long-term interventions will consist of two
separate scenarios; the first scenario aims at improving the existing OR Delay Code system
and the second scenario explores the option of OR delay monitoring without the OR Delay
Code.
Short-term interventions
Organizational Interventions to Support the OR Delay Code
The organizational arrangement should support supervision and skill building.
- An intervention to support supervision in order to control data quality includes the
institutionalization of regular meetings with nurses to review data quality. The meeting
can be part of the regular staff meeting but the discussion should be facilitated based on
the information on data quality provided by the OR Administration. A facilitation manual
for the meeting should be developed and supervisors should be trained in order to ensure
the consistency of regular meetings across different groups of nurses.
- A simple user manual should be developed in order to standardize the process of
determining delay causes and data entry procedures. The study found an inconsistency in
nurses' knowledge and skills in data collection. It is unreasonable to expect nurses to read
the manual and adopt it to their practice without any support. Therefore, a refresher
training course should be designed with sufficient practical exercise sessions. The
training should be part of a routine continuing education program for nurses.
Organizational intervention should also target information use.
- Organizing a series of feedback seminars focused on OR delays and OR efficiency would
improve the level of understanding among stakeholders. It would also provide a chance to
talk about the poor data quality and introduce interventions that are then instituted to
demonstrate the organizational commitment on OR efficiency.
- Establishing a committee for OR efficiency and taking immediate action to improve some
of the OR delay problems would have a positive impact in improving the performance of
the OR Delay Code.
Technical interventions to understand the etiologies of "previous case delay" and "procedure
longer than booked" and modification of the OR Delay Code application"
The delay types "previous case delay" and "procedure longer than booked" accounted for 35
percent of "before delays" and 57 percent of "after delays," respectively. In spite of the
frequent use of these types, they do not elicit much information on why these problems occur
or what causes nurses to use these delay codes. Our study suggests that the main reasons for
the frequent use of these codes includes technical issues such as the OR Delay Code data
structure and the selection of delay types. Solving these problems could adjust the number of
delayed cases and their durations, as well as providing stakeholders with a better set of delay
information.
Develop an action plan to reduce OR delays for the next six months based on an analysis of
the existing data
Fast acting solutions to improve some aspects of OR delays will have a positive impact on the
stakeholders' perceptions of the usefulness of the OR Delay Code. Rather than waiting for
the improvement of data quality, actions should be developed based on the existing data set.
Examples of interventions include the improvement of data quality by the standardization of
name spelling, the elimination of unused delay types from the database, and a refresher course
on the OR Delay Code to explain applications and delay code definitions.
Mid-long term interventions
Improvement based on the existing OR Delay Code
In addition to the suggestions made for short-term improvements, the following actions are
recommended for mid- to long-term improvement of the OR Delay Code. This assumes the
continuation of use of the OR Delay Code as a means of collecting data on OR delays.
Advantages of this approach are: 1) incremental changes based on the existing data collection
mechanism ensures a sense of familiarity among stakeholders, 2) a routine data collection
mechanism provides continuous monitoring of OR delays, and 3) nurses' time spent on OR
Delay Code is considered a failing cost. Disadvantages include 1) expansion of data variables
to satisfy demand for comprehensive, illustrative data will be prohibitively labor intensive and
expensive, 2) extensive training of data collectors will be necessary to standardize procedures
and 3) maintaining a high quality data collection mechanism by providing continuous training,
information sharing, and supervision will substantially increase the cost of the OR Delay
Code.
- Institute a comprehensive OR delay data collection mechanism to cover the entire
OR patient's pathway from his/her entrance to the hospital to his/her exit.
There is a feeling amongst OR nurses that they are not able to capture delay
causes which happen outside of the OR. The OR Delay Code should be
expanded to capture delays from an OR patient's entry into the hospital to the
time that patient leaves the hospital (or enters the inpatient ward). In this case,
the OR Delay Code should be renamed as the OR Patient Pathway Data. The
identification of appropriate data collectors and all necessary training will also
be required.
SRevision of OR Delay categories and types
One of the technical factors found by this study is the inconsistency of OR delay
types. In addition to the OR delay types "Previous case delay" and "Procedure
longer than booked", the OR delay data structure should be revised to reflect
cause-effect relationships among delay category/type. For example, instead of
including it in "Administrative" category, designate "paper work category" as an
independent category and include specific paper work related problems as delay
types. Another idea is to upgrade "procedure longer than booked" from a delay
type to a delay category and create new types which would explain the causes of
the elongated procedures. At the same time, the categories and procedures
which are rarely used should be grouped under "other" category or eliminated
from the database.
) Revision of the OR Delay Code application
The above interventions require the modification of the OR Delay Code
application.
SDefine OR Efficiency and ensure consensus from all stakeholders
We found that stakeholders had different views on the importance of OR
efficiency. It is easy to conceive why people would not be motivated to act
without understanding the rationale for having OR delay information. The
importance of agreement on OR delays and efficiency has already been
discussed in previous chapters.
SImprove nurses' credibility in collecting OR delay data
Even if the quality of the data improves, stakeholders may not use the data if
their perceived level of the data quality remains poor. As nurses' credibility
improves, so will the perceived level of data quality. One possible intervention
is to demonstrate that the OR Delay Code is not intended to identify an
individual for punishment, but to create corrective action plans. In the long term,
the pervading "culture of three competing forces" and the "culture of blame"
must be tackled.
Improvement by establishing different data collection mechanisms (an option with no OR
Delay Code)
The demand for detailed, illustrative, comprehensive data on OR delays to help develop
action plans is not easily satisfied by a routine data collection mechanism such as the OR
Delay Code. Instead of maintaining an ineffective data collection system, we propose a
periodical evaluation study on OR delays to be conducted by a third party. This option
recommends the elimination of the recording of causes of OR delays in the OR Delay Code,
but institutes a continuous monitoring of a patient's progression through the Peri-Op database.
Advantages of this approach include; 1) objective assessment of OR Delays through the third
party evaluation will provide illustrative, comprehensive information on delays, 2) it will
allow the study to focus on particular issues of interest to stakeholders, 3) use of third-party
evaluators will eliminate the concern over the conflicts of interest of internal data collectors
and, thus, improve the perceived level of the data quality, 4) the stress amongst nurses will be
reduced by eliminating their data collection responsibilities, and 5) data on the length of
surgeries from Peri-Op records will allow routine monitoring and analysis of OR delays.
Disadvantages of this approach include; 1) the routine data collection of delay category and
type will not be feasible, 2) third-party researchers will require financial as well as
organizational resources, and 3) there will be no opportunity to retrieve data on delay causes
between periodical evaluation studies.
This approach will require the following:
> Redefine OR Efficiency and ensure consensus from all stakeholders
SEstablish an OR Efficiency Committee
The OR Efficiency Committee will be responsible for the coordination of
periodical evaluation studies on OR delays. The suggested tasks of the
committee include: identify third-party researchers to conduct the evaluation,
review and approve the evaluation design, supervise implementation of the
evaluation, review and approve results, disseminate the findings, and develop an
action plan for improving OR delays.
SImplement a periodical OR delay evaluation
> Develop an action plan to improve OR efficiency based on the evaluation of OR
delays
0 Continue monitoring and analyzing delay lengths
The elimination of the OR Delay Code does not mean the continuous monitoring
and analysis of delay lengths is unnecessary. The existing Peri-Op data will
provide sufficient information for the monitoring and analysis of OR delays with
stratification by surgery types, OR suites, surgeons, nurses, and before/after
categories.
Conclusion
Our study conducted the performance assessment of an information system at a large teaching
hospital by adopting an analytical framework proposed by the MEASURE Evaluation Project.
We assessed the quantifiable and qualitative data quality and the level of information use and
analyzed the factors affecting the performance. At the end, we proposed a set of
recommendations to improve the performance of the information system. One possible
recommendation was the replacement of the information system with a periodical evaluation
on OR delays by a third-party evaluator to increase the comprehensiveness and objectivity of
the data. Other existing data sources are considered to satisfy data requirements for routine
monitoring of OR delay occurrences.
The information system assessed by this study was developed to address a very specific issue
of hospital management, i.e. OR delays, and is a small system in terms of the data volume.
The design of the data collection is simple with just one data entry screen, and there have
been several revisions to improve the functionality of the information system. There was also
a general agreement among stakeholders that the problem that the system is addressing is an
important one. Despite the simplicity of its design, the importance of the issue, and the
efforts of the system users, the information system performed poorly. We investigated
performance determinants by examining technical, behavioral, and organizational factors. In
addition to technical factors such as the choice and structure of data variables and the
application design, our study found that organizational factors such as the lack of a defined
purpose for the information system and a lack of supervision and training, as well as
behavioral factors such as motivation, skills, and knowledge strongly influenced the
performance of the information system.
Information technology in the healthcare industry in the United States will be rapidly adopted
with the hopes of improving operational efficiency and patient safety. This study indicates
that without the proper treatment of organizational and behavioral factors, even information
technology intervention will have a limited impact in realizing its expectations.
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Table 1: Summary of Delays in FY2006
Total Number of OR Cases 35,426
Cases with before delay 16,173
Cases with after delay 14,796
Cases without delay 11,111
Cases with both delays 6,654
OR cases between September 1 2005 and August 31 2006
OR cases from the Main OR, SDSU, and West wing facility OR are included in the analysis.
Table 2: Lengths of Delays (minutes)
Average length of delay 41
Average length of before delay 29
Average length of after delay 53
Sum of delays 1,316,935
Sum of before delays 478,391
Sum of after delays 838,544
Table 3: Number of Cases with Delays in FY2006
BEFORE AFTER
Surgical Services BEFORE AFTER CASESDELAYS DELAYS
ANCILLARY SERVICES 12 9 24
ANESTHESIOLOGY 6 8 23
BURN 138 187 366
CARDIAC 256 1072 1335
DERMATOLOGY 26 20 50
EMERG/URG SURGERY 798 923 1527
GENERAL SURGERY 1778 1660 3863
GYNECOLOGY 1070 1000 2294
NEUROSURGERY 1038 1147 2275
ORAL/MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 265 278 566
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 5403 4154 9923
PAIN 4 6 8
PEDIATRIC SURGERY 570 687 1526
PLASTIC SURGERY 951 730 1654
RADIATION ONCOLOGY 15 13 31
SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 1266 965 2578
THORACIC SURGERY 875 723 1936
TRANSPLANT 482 391 801
UROLOGY 1045 1107 2888
VASCULAR SURGERY 497 750 1578
Total 16495 15830 35246
Table 4: Proportion of Cases with Delays by Surgical Services in FY2006
Surgical Services BEFORE AFTER
ANCILLARY SERVICES 50.0% 37.5%
ANESTHESIOLOGY 26.1% 34.8%
BURN 37.7% 51.1%
CARDIAC 19.2% 80.3%
DERMATOLOGY 52.0% 40.0%
EMERG/URG SURGERY 52.3% 60.4%
GENERAL SURGERY 46.0% 43.0%
GYNECOLOGY 46.6% 43.6%
NEUROSURGERY 45.6% 50.4%
ORAL/MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 46.8% 49.1%
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 54.4% 41.9%
PAIN 50.0% 75.0%
PEDIATRIC SURGERY 37.4% 45.0%
PLASTIC SURGERY 57.5% 44.1%
RADIATION ONCOLOGY 48.4% 41.9%
SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 49.1% 37.4%
THORACIC SURGERY 45.2% 37.3%
TRANSPLANT 60.2% 48.8%
UROLOGY 36.2% 38.3%
VASCULAR SURGERY 31.5% 47.5%
Average 46.8% 44.9%
Table 5: Average Length of Delays by Surgical Services (in minutes)
Surgical Services BEFORE AFTER TOTAL
ANCILLARY SERVICES 27.4 40.2 32.9
ANESTHESIOLOGY 29.8 27.6 28.6
BURN 37.7 65.7 53.8
CARDIAC 34.8 118.1 102.0
DERMATOLOGY 13.7 24.0 18.2
EMERG/URG SURGERY 33.6 62.6 49.1
GENERAL SURGERY 25.8 42.0 33.6
GYNECOLOGY 24.7 42.5 33.3
NEUROSURGERY 35.7 71.1 54.3
ORAL/MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 27.5 56.4 42.3
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 28.1 42.3 34.3
PAIN 37.0 17.0 25.0
PEDIATRIC SURGERY 26.3 39.5 33.5
PLASTIC SURGERY 26.4 56.5 39.5
RADIATION ONCOLOGY 21.1 20.3 20.7
SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 25.5 37.4 30.7
THORACIC SURGERY 36.4 55.7 45.1
TRANSPLANT 38.3 58.9 47.5
UROLOGY 26.4 35.3 31.0
VASCULAR SURGERY 34.3 64.8 52.7
Average 29.0 53.0 40.7
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Table 9 (1): Number of Delay Cases by Delay Category and Delay Type
Delay Category Delay Tmype BEPORE AFTER Total
ADMINISTRATIVE ADMITTING/FINANCIAL ISSUE 7 7
INTERPRETER SERVICES 67 67
MASS EYE AND EAR PATIENT -
PAPERWORK
MOR PACU WAITLIST 10 570 580
OLD CHART NOT AVAILABLE 5 5
OTHER 147 128 275
PAPERWORK (CONSENT, ETC) ISSUE 354 354
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY 378 378
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY 26 118 144
TEAM CONFERENCE 4 4
ADMINISTRATIVE Sub-Total 1002 8Ol 1818
ANESTHESIA AIRWAY RELATED 300 300
ANESTHESIA STAFF IN ANOTHER 142 88 230
ROOM
ANESTHESIA STAFF LATE 111 111
ANESTHESIA TRAVEL DELAY 317 317
CLINICAL/TECHNICAL RELATED 106 106
IN ROOM EARLY FOR PATIENT PREP 110 110
OTHER 1183 302 1485
PROLONGED WAKE UP 1031 1031
REGIONAL ANESTHESIA RELATED 680 156 836
SPECIAL MONITORING RELATED 164 164
ANESTHESIA Sub-Total 2433 2267 4890
Table 9 (2)
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER Total
ANESTHETIC - EQUIPMENT NOTEQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 1 1 2
REQUESTED
ANESTHETIC - EQUIPMENT
UNAVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT FAILURE 17 48 65
NOT REQUESTED 14 7 21
NOT STERILE 115 28 143
OTHER 167 93 260
UNAVAILABLE 29 30 59
EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 348 210 558
Sub-Total
NURSING CASE SET-UP DELAY 138 138
CIRCULATING NURSE DELAY 16 16
CLEAN-UP DELAY 34 34
OTHER 67 58 125
SCRUB NURSE DELAY 15 15
NURSING Sub-Total 270 58 328
PATIENT COMPLICATION 60 133 193
DELAY IN SDSU 223 223
LATE ARRIVING AT MGH 238 238
OTHER 714 418 1132
PATIENT MARKING FOR
37 37
SURGERY
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN
317 317SENT FOR
PREP PROBLEMS (LABS, ETC) 518 518
PATIENT Sub-Total 2107 551 2658
Table 9 (3)
Delay Category Delay Type 7 BEFORE AFTER Total
RADIOLOGY/OTHER CATH LAB DELAY 4 4ANCILLARY
EEG MONITORING 15 1 16
IORT DELAY 1 1
OTHER 54 55 109
PATHOLOGY RELATED 31 31
PATIENT IN BREAST IMAGING 73 73
PATIENT IN CT/MRI 75 75
RADIOLOGY EQUIPMENT NOT
AVAILABLE
RADIOLOGY EQUIPMENT PROBLEM 2 2
RADIOLOGY TECHNICIAN DELAY 4 24 28
RADIOLOGY/OTHER
228.114 342ANCILLARY Sub-Total 2 1
SCHEDULING BUMPED FOR EMERGENCY 69 69
NO CASE TO FOLLOW 56 56
OTHER 344 382 726
PATIENT INFORMED OF
22 22INCORRECT SURGERY TIME
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY 5396 5396
SCHEDULING CHANGE (WAITLIST, 1191 1191
ROOM CHANGE, ETC)
SURGEON NOT INFORMED OF TIME
CHANGE 11 1 12
CHANGE
SCHEDULING Sub-Total 1 7033 439 7472
Table 9 (4)
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER Total
SURGEON/SURGICAL ATTENDING SURGEON LATE 898 192 1090
ORGAN DONOR DELAY 24 12 36
OTHER 282 170 452
PATHOLOGY RELATED 32 32
PATIENT POSITIONING 51 51
PROCEDURE ADDED 297 297
PROCEDURE CHANGE 80 80
PROCEDURE COMPLICATION 175 175
PROCEDURE LONGER THAN
BOOKED 9007 9007BOOKED
RESIDENT LATE 32 78 110
SECOND SURGEON LATE 15 16 31
SITE VERIFICATION 6 3 9
SPONGE/INSTRUMENT 12 12
UNACCOUNTED
SURGEON DELAY IN MOR 133 15 148
SURGEON DELAY IN SDSU 45 10 55
SURGEON DOUBLE BOOKED 382 38 420
SURGEON IN ANOTHER ROOM 335 33 368
SURGEON/SURGICAL Sub- : I ..21Total. 2152 10221 12373Total
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT CASE SET-UP DELAY 110 110
CLEAN-UP DELAY 220 220
MOR PACU WAITLIST 34 729 763
OTHER 236 157 393
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN SENT 209 209
FOR
PATIENT PUT ON CALL TOO LATE 9 9
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY 24 196 220
TRANSPORT NOT READY 74 21 95
WAITING FOR ICU BED
AVAILABILITY
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT 922 1164 2086
S; 922 1 2086Sub-Total
TOTAL 1 J 16495 j 158301 32325
Table 10: Lengths of Delays b Delay Category and pe
Delay Category No* Type BEFORE AFTER Foul_
ADMINISTRATIVE ADMITTING/FINANCIAL ISSUE 0 32 32
INTERPRETER SERVICES 0 29 29
MASS EYE AND EAR PATIENT -
PAPERWORK
MOR PACU WAITLIST 43 24 43
OLD CHART NOT AVAILABLE 0 46 46
OTHER 41 32 36
PAPERWORK (CONSENT, ETC) ISSUE 0 27 27
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY 0 33 33
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY 21 22 21
TEAM CONFERENCE 0 23 23
ADMINISTRATIVE Sub-Total 39 30 34
ANESTHESIA AIRWAY RELATED 34 0 34
ANESTHESIA STAFF IN ANOTHER
ROOM27 26 27
ANESTHESIA STAFF LATE 0 21 21
ANESTHESIA TRAVEL DELAY 0 28 28
CLINICAL/TECHNICAL RELATED 44 0 44
IN ROOM EARLY FOR PATIENT PREP 55 0 55
OTHER 35 27 29
PROLONGED WAKE UP 27 0 27
REGIONAL ANESTHESIA RELATED 35 27 28
SPECIAL MONITORING RELATED 56 0 56
ANESTHESIA Sub-Total 34 27 30
Table 10 (2)
Delay Category J Delay Type BEFORE AFTER Total
ANESTHETIC - EQUIPMENT NOTEQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 59 36 48
REQUESTED
ANESTHETIC - EQUIPMENT
UNAVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT FAILURE 24 29 25
NOT REQUESTED 24 31 28
NOT STERILE 27 29 29
OTHER 35 33 34
UNAVAILABLE 39 44 42
EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 31 32 32Sub-Total 3 32_ 32
NURSING CASE SET-UP DELAY 0 23 23
CIRCULATING NURSE DELAY 0 15 15
CLEAN-UP DELAY 0 26 26
OTHER 31 21 26
SCRUB NURSE DELAY 0 16 16
NURSING Sub-Total 31 22 24
PATIENT COMPLICATION 59 34 51
DELAY IN SDSU 0 22 22
LATE ARRIVING AT MGH 0 32 32
OTHER 33 29 31
PATIENT MARKING FOR 0 20 20
SURGERY
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN
0 28 28SENT FOR
PREP PROBLEMS (LABS, ETC) 0 29 29
PATIENT Sub-Total 40 29 31
Table 10 (3)
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER Total
RADIOLOGY/OTHER
CATH LAB DELAY 0 42 42ANCILLARY
EEG MONITORING 20 15 15
IORT DELAY 14 0 14
OTHER 32 57 44
PATHOLOGY RELATED 27 0 27
PATIENT IN BREAST IMAGING 0 37 37
PATIENT IN CT/MRI 0 70 70
RADIOLOGY EQUIPMENT NOT
AVAILABLE
RADIOLOGY EQUIPMENT PROBLEM 0 8 8
RADIOLOGY TECHNICIAN DELAY 54 23 50
RADIOLOGY/OTHER
ANCILLARY Sub-Total
SCHEDULING BUMPED FOR EMERGENCY 0 52 52
NO CASE TO FOLLOW 37 0 37
OTHER 36 34 35
PATIENT INFORMED OF INCORRECT
SURGERY TIME
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY 0 27 27
SCHEDULING CHANGE (WAITLIST,
ROOM CHANGE, ETC)
SURGEON NOT INFORMED OF TIME
CHAGE49 33 34CHANGE
SCHEDULING Sub-Total 36 29 30
Table 10 (4)
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER Total
SURGEON/SURGICAL ATTENDING SURGEON LATE 32 21 23
ORGAN DONOR DELAY 112 79 90
OTHER 42 29 34
PATHOLOGY RELATED 39 0 39
PATIENT POSITIONING 29 0 29
PROCEDURE ADDED 73 0 73
PROCEDURE CHANGE 80 0 80
PROCEDURE COMPLICATION 107 0 107
PROCEDURE LONGER THAN
BOOKED
RESIDENT LATE 68 21 54
SECOND SURGEON LATE 47 24 36
SITE VERIFICATION 137 21 60
SPONGE/INSTRUMENT
UNACCOUNTED
SURGEON DELAY IN MOR 49 34 36
SURGEON DELAY IN SDSU 20 40 36
SURGEON DOUBLE BOOKED 28 31 31
SURGEON IN ANOTHER ROOM 35 43 42
SURGEON/SURGICAL Sub- 62 29 56Total .
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT CASE SET-UP DELAY 0 21 21
CLEAN-UP DELAY 0 24 24
MOR PACU WAITLIST 45 31 44
OTHER 32 29 30
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN SENT
FOR0 31 31
PATIENT PUT ON CALL TOO LATE 0 22 22
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY 22 18 21
TRANSPORT NOT READY 24 26 26
WAITING FOR ICU BED
AVAILABILITY
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT 41 27 35
Sub-Total
TOTAL 53 29 41
Table 11: Sum of Delay Lengths by Category and Type (in minutes)
Delay Minutes by Code Total Delay Minutes
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER TOTAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ADMITTING/FINANCIAL ISSUE 0 227 227
INTERPRETER SERVICES 0 1930 1930
MASS EYE AND EAR PATIENT -
0 93 93
PAPERWORK
MOR PACU WAITLIST 2443 238 24701
OLD CHART NOT AVAILABLE 0 231 231
OTHER 5254 4686 9940
PAPERWORK (CONSENT, ETC) ISSUE 0 9646 9646
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY 0 12390 12390
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY 2500 564 3064
TEAM CONFERENCE 0 93 93
ADMINISTRATIVE Sub-total 32217 30098 62315
ANESTHESIA AIRWAY RELATED 10089 0 10089
ANESTHESIA STAFF IN ANOTHER
2363 3746 6109
ROOM
ANESTHESIA STAFF LATE 0 2290 2290
ANESTHESIA TRAVEL DELAY 0 8844 8844
CLINICAL/TECHNICAL RELATED 4693 0 4693
IN ROOM EARLY FOR PATIENT PREP 6101 0 6101
OTHER 10432 32134 42566
PROLONGED WAKE UP 27541 0 27541
REGIONAL ANESTHESIA RELATED 5384 .181t.14 23498
SPECIAL MONITORING RELATED 9178 0 9178
ANESTHESIA Sub-total 75781 65128 140909
Table 11 (2)
Delay Minutes by Code Total Delay Minutes
Delay Category Delay Type BEFORE AFTER TOTAL
ANESTHETIC-EQUIPMENTEQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 59 36 207
NOT REQUESTED
ANESTHETIC - EQUIPMENT
42 88 18
UNAVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT FAILURE 1131 497 1628
NOT REQUESTED 165 431 596
NOT STERILE 754 3367 4121
OTHER 3224 5506 8730
UNAVAILABLE 1178 1274 2452
EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION Sub-total 6553 11199 17752
NURSING CASE SET-UP DELAY 0 3192 3192
CIRCULATING NURSE DELAY 0 412 412
CLEAN-UP DELAY 0 733 733
OTHER 1770 1424 3194
SCRUB NURSE DELAY 0 236 236
NURSING Sub-total 1770 5997 7767
PATIENT COMPLICATION 7865 2058 9923
DELAY IN SDSU 0 4965 4965
LATE ARRIVING AT MGH 0 7680 7680
OTHER 13947 20878 34825
PATIENT MARKING FOR 727 727
SURGERY
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN
0 8956 8956SENT FOR
PREP PROBLEMS (LABS, ETC) 0 15224 15224
PATIENT Sub-total 21812 60488 82300
Table 11 (3)
RADIOLOGY/OTHER
ANCILLARY CATH LAB DELAY
EEG MONITORING
IORT DELAY
OTHER
PATHOLOGY RELATED
PATIENT IN BREAST IMAGING
PATIENT IN CT/MRI
RADIOLOGY EQUIPMENT PROBLEM
RADIOLOGY TECHNICIAN DELAY
RADIOLOGY/OTHER ANCILLARY Sub-total
SCHEDULING BUMPED FOR EMERGENCY
NO CASE TO FOLLOW
OTHER
PATIENT INFORMED OF INCORRECT
SURGERY TIME
PREVIOUS CASE DELAY
SCHEDULING CHANGE (WAITLIST,
ROOM CHANGE, ETC)
SURGEON NOT INFORMED OF TIME
CHANGE
SCHEDULING Sub-total
166
20
14
1758
850
0
0
77
0
1299
4018
0
2066
13891
0
0
0
49
16006
227
0
3074
0
2724
5258
50
16
90
11605
3589
0
11593
893
148134
42172
358
206739
197
216
1150
3696
850
2724
5258
127
16
1389
15623
3589
2066
25484
893
148134
42172
407
222745
Table 11 (4)
SURGEON/SURGICAL ATTENDING SURGEON LATE
ORGAN DONOR DELAY
OTHER
PATHOLOGY RELATED
PATIENT POSITIONING
PROCEDURE ADDED
PROCEDURE CHANGE
PROCEDURE COMPLICATION
PROCEDURE LONGER THAN BOOKED
RESIDENT LATE
SECOND SURGEON LATE
SITE VERIFICATION
SURGEON DELAY IN MOR
SURGEON DELAY IN SDSU
SURGEON DOUBLE BOOKED
SURGEON IN ANOTHER ROOM
SURGEON/SURGICAL Sub-total
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT CASE SET-UP DELAY
CLEAN-UP DELAY
MOR PACU WAITLIST
OTHER
PATIENT NOT READY WHEN SENT
FOR
PATIENT PUT ON CALL TOO LATE
SDSU RECOVERY ROOM DELAY
TRANSPORT NOT READY
WAITING FOR ICU BED AVAILABILITY
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT Sub-total
Total
6101
1347
7121
1236
1458
21706
6404
1'8e45
558084
5293
746
412
707
742
195
1058
1150
632404
0
0
32892
5044
0
0
4279
496
5272
47983
838544
18801
1897
8122
0
0
0
0
0
0
677
365
126
0
4539
1789
11831
14272
62419
2297
5340
1045
6825
6387
194
440
1936
254
24718
478391
24902
3244
15243
1236
1458
21705
6404
18645
558084
5970
1111
538
707
5281
1984
12889
15422
694823
2297
5340
33937
11869
6387
194
4719
2432
5526
72701
1316935
Table 12: Proportion of "Other" as Delay Type by Delay Category
OR Delay Category BEFORE AFTER
ADMINISTRATIVE 15% 16%
ANESTHESIA 49% 13%
EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION 48% 44%
NURSING 25% 100%
PATIENT 34% 76%
RADIOLOGY/OTHER ANCILLARY 24% 48%
SCHEDULING 5% 87%
SURGEON/SURGICAL 13% 2%
TURNOVER/TRANSPORT 26% 13%
Figure 5: Revised Performance of the OR Delay Code
Performance of the OR Delay Code
Annex 1: Interview guide for OR delay code research - key informant
interview
HISTORY of the OR Delay Code Database:
- What is the development history of the OR Delay Code Database?
- Who (job title) initiated the design of the database?
- What were the original objectives of the database? For whom the database was originally
designed?
- Does the original development plan exist? If so, may I see it?
- Who designed the database? Please describe the design/development process.
- When the OR Delay Code was first introduced?
- How the data variables were selected? What job category of people participated in the
selection?
- Has the function of the database reviewed? If so, when and by whom? What was the
outcome of the review? Is there any report on the review?
- Has the database been modified? When? Why? What kinds of changes were made?
INPUTS:
a) Technical factors
i. Complexity of the procedure - data entry protocol
ii. Data collection design
Ji) Any regular schedule for data transmission?
,2) Regular schedule for data review?
) Who is supposed to review the data quality?
C) Who analyze the data?
) Who are the recipients of data?
) Who are the recipients of analyzed information?
C) How often the data is supposed to be analyzed?
iii. Software design - review of the design for usability
iv. Analytical functions as part of the software design
v. Manual (software use, analysis, decision-making)
vi. Data entry function
vii. Data display/presentation functions
viii. Management structure of the database - membership?
ix. Training -- how long? By whom? Content of training?
x. Time spent on data entry
xi. Time spent on data analysis and frequency
b) Organizational factors
i. Culture of OR time management - who determines the success or failure of OR
management, based on what criteria, level of participation for decision-making, who
has strong say in decision-making of OR scheduling
ii. Culture on use of information
T Does the organization support/encourage nurses to take action based on the
information from the database?
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( Do the nurses know what kind of information can be generated through the
database?
C3 Do nurses feel like they are allowed/encouraged to use the data from the
database? Do nurses feel like they are empowered to use the data?
C4 Does the organization support physicians to take action based on the information
from the database?
C Do physicians know what kind of information can be generated through the
database?
(® Do nurses feel like they are allowed/encouraged to use the data?
(7) Does the OR management know what kind of information can be generated
through the database?
$ Do the OR managers feel they are supported by organization to take action based
on the information from the database?
, Do the OR managers feel they allow nurses/physicians to take action based on
the information from the database?
C) Do physicians (Anesthesiologists and surgeons) know what kind of information
can be generated through the database?
1) Do physicians feel they are encouraged/supported to take actions based on
information generated by the database?
0 Do data collectors (nurses) know who read/analyze the data?
j) Do data collectors (nurses) know who take action based on the data?
@) How much nurses are involved in data analysis?
,f How much physicians are involved in analyzing the data?
@6) Is there any OR performance criteria based on the OR patient delay?
@) Do surgeons or anesthesiologist use data for their performance evaluation?
iii. Governance of database management
C) OR management structure and membership
2) Alignment of OR management objectives and OR database objectives
Q) Consensus on the database objectives
C) Recognition of the database by the senior executive
iv. Operations
) Review of the database
) Responsibilities of the database management - who are responsible for what?
C Manuals (topics covered in the manual)
CC Supervision of data entry
v. Information
T Information needs review and alignment with the database
2 Definition of data variables and indicators
0 Existence of OR management monitoring indicators and definitions
C, Aligmrnent with OR management monitoring indicators and the database
C Accessibility to information
c) Behavioral factors
i. Knowledge and skills
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O Rationale for including specific data variables
(C9 Data entry skills and comfort level among nurses
(3) Awareness of data quality and skills of checking it among data collectors,
physicians, OR management
(4) Problem-solving skills based on the information
ii. Competence in data analysis and use of information
iii. Confidence level on the data handling and analysis
iv. Motivation - what motivates to use the database?
PROCESS:
a) Understanding of responsibilities for each step of data handling process
b) Data feedback rules and mechanism
OUTPUTS:
a) Data quality
i. Data accuracy - perceived data quality
ii. Data timeliness - when information is needed, information is available
iii. Comprehensiveness of the data items - alignment with the objectives of the database
iv. Relevance of data variables - alignment with the objectives of the database
b) Use of information
i. Perceived level of discussion on the information provided by the database (by nurses,
physicians, and OR management)
ii. Evidence of discussion (minutes of meeting, etc)
iii. Perceived level of decision making taken based on the information provided by the
database
iv. Evidence of the decision making (minutes of the meeting, actual actions taken, etc)
v. Feedback report production
vi. Report submitted to the management
OUTCOME:
- For what purpose the database was designed?
- Efficiency improvement in OR management?
> How the database is perceived to contribute to the OR management?
> What aspects of OR management is considered relevant to the database?
- Is there any sign that these objectives are met?
IMPACT:
- Why improvement of OR management matters?
- What are the OR management objectives?
- How the objectives of the OR management related to the overall goal of the OR?
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Annex 2: List of key information/focus group respondents
Job category
OR Administration Managers
OR Information Technology
Nurses
Surgeons
Anesthesiologists
Number of respondents
4
2
7
2
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